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By JON VAN DYKE*
The grand jury, an ancient protection against governmental abuse
of power, became the subject of sharp controversy during the Nixon and
Ford administrations because its secret and powerful processes had been
manipulated by government lawyers conducting dragnet-type investiga-
tions of political activists and radical organizations.' With the out-
break of the Watergate scandal in 1972, the positive role of this
ancient body was observed once again when the government's highest
officials were obliged to appear before a body of citizens who had the
power to hand down indictments upon finding probable cause that
crimes had been committed.
Thus, even though the power of the grand jury has been abused, it
may still provide a needed shield against governmental oppression in
some situations. When confronted with governmental overreaching, the
grand jury has the power to refuse to indict persons that the government
wishes to prosecute.' But perhaps more important, the grand jury also
has the power to investigate the activities of governmental agenices in a
uniquely probing and thorough manner. This independent panel of
citizens has more power to investigate and uncover abuses of power than
* Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law. Visiting Professor of Law,
University of Hawaii, 1976-77. B.A. 1964, Yale University; J.D. 1967, Harvard Uni-
versity.
1. See, e.g., L. CLARK, THE GRANi JuRY; Tim UsE ANi) ABUSE OF PoLmcAL
POWER (1975); Donner & Cerruti, The Grand Jury Network, TnE NATION Jan. 3, 1972,
at 5-20; Charles Goodell, Where Did The Grand Jury Go?, HARPERs MAGAZINE May
1973, at 14, reprinted in GOODELL, POLTCAL PRISONERS IN AMERICA 233-54 (1973).
See also Harris, Annals of the Law (Taking the Fifth), (pts. 1-3) THE NEW YORKER,
Apr. 5, 1976, at 44, Apr. 12, 1976, at 43, Apr. 19, 1976, at 42.
2. A typical example is the case of investigative reporter Leslie Whitten. Whit-
ten, an associate of columnist Jack Anderson, was accused in late January 1973 of
possessing documents stolen from the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The District of
Columbia Grand Jury found the government's evidence to be inadequate and refused to
return an indictment, thereby forcing the government to abandon its prosecution. San
Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 16, 1973, at 10, col. 5.
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any other governmental body simply because the grand jurors are
independent citizens who fade anonymously back into the community
when their job is done; as private citizens, they need not fear future job
reprisals, or face other pressures that inevitably occur when the investi-
gators are part of the system being investigated. Special Prosecutor
Leon Jaworski, in his July 1974 brief before the Supreme Court in Unit-
ed States v. Nixon,3 demanding President Nixon's tapes and defending
the action of the grand jury in naming Nixon a co-conspirator, described
the grand jury as "this body of citizens, randomly selected, beholden
neither to court nor to prosecutor, trusted historically to protect the
individual against unwarranted government charges, but sworn to ferret
out criminality by the exalted and powerful as well as by the humble and
weak. . .. "I
The grand jury is thus an institution of great power, and a potential
force for good that can easily be abused through harrassing investiga-
tions and unjustified indictments. This article focuses on the methods
by which grand jurors are selected, because the composition of the
grand jury will inevitably influence which topics the grand jurors choose
to investigate and which persons they indict.
History of the Grand Jury
The formal separation of the grand jury from the trial jury oc-
curred in 1350 when the English Parliament passed a statute forbidding
grand jurors from sitting on the trial juries of defendants they had
indicted.5 Thereafter, when one of the king's many traveling justices
arrived to hear the disputes of a community, the sheriff would pick
twelve men from the immediate surrounding community to serve as
local jurors; he would then select an additional group of twenty-four
men, usually knights, from a larger area to serve as an accusing body for
the entire county. These twenty-four men, after eliminating one mem-
ber to preclude the possibility of a deadlock, began investigating inci-
dents throughout the county under the title of "le graunde inquest," and
quickly took over the entire burden of filing indictments.'
The form of the grand jury was thus established at an early date,
but over 300 years passed before the independence of the grand jury
3. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
4. N.Y. Times, July 2, 1974, at 20, col. 6.
5. 25 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1350).
6. F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 646-47 (2d ed. 1898,
reissued 1968); 3 REvVES, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 133 (3d ed. 1814).
[Vol. 28
was finally recognized. In 1681, eleven years after the trial jury's
independence was established in Bushell's Case,7 the grand jury of
London refused to return an indictment against Stephen Colledge, who
was accused 'of treason. After hearing the prosecutions' witnesses and
questioning them in private, the grand jurors returned the bill presented
by the prosecutor with the word "ignoramus" written on its back. The
royal authorities then presented the same evidence before the Oxford
grand jury which returned the indictment, apparently not sharing the
politics of its counterpart in London.' The principle that a grand jury
could stand between the king and the accused was nonetheless estab-
lished and spread quickly throughout England, as well as to the Ameri-
can Colonies.
Independent grand juries played an important role in the years
before the American Revolution.1" During the early debates in the
Massachusetts Legislature over the ratification of the Constitution, be-
fore the Bill of Rights had been written and presented to the states,
Abraham Holmes complained:
[Tihere is no provision made in the Constitution to prevent the
attorney-general from filing information against any person,
whether he is indicted by the grand jury or not; in consequence
of which the most innocent person in the commonwealth may be
taken by virtue of a warrant issued in consequence of such infor-
mation .... 11
Because of this fear, when the Bill of Rights was prepared, the protec-
tion of the grand jury was provided for in the proposed fifth amendment
as a bulwark against governmental oppression, and was accepted as part
of the Bill of Rights without debate.
The Supreme Court's Treatment of the Grand Jury
The United States Supreme Court has not been a careful guardian
of the protections offered by the grand jury. The first time the Court
7. 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
8. The word means "we are ignorant" or "we ignore it" in Latin. BLACK'S LAW
DIcnONARY 881 (4th ed. 1968).
9. The Trial of Stephen Colledge, at Oxford, for High Treason, [1681] 8 How. St.
Tr. 550. See also Proceedings at the Old-Bailey against Anthony Earl of Shaftsbury,
[1681] 8 How. St. Tr. 759.
10. For a discussion of the development of the grand jury in the American
colonies during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries see Van Dyke & Wolin-
sky, Quadra v. Superior Court of San Francisco: A Challenge to the Composition of the
San Francisco Grand Jury, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 565, 592-93 (1976).
11. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 110 (2d ed. 1881).
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considered the grand jury in any detail was in Hurtado v. California,'2 a
case challenging an amendment to a provision of the California Consti-
tution' 3 that had eliminated the necessity for a grand jury indictment by
allowing an accused to be brought to trial after an information filed by
the district attorney and an examination before a magistrate. The
Supreme Court tested the California change by asking whether the
information and its accompanying preliminary hearing satisfied the
requirements of the due process of law guaranteed to all Americans by
the fourteenth amendment. The Court concluded that the minimum
requisites of liberty and justice were in fact preserved by a preliminary
hearing in which the district attorney was obliged to establish probable
guilt before a neutral magistrate.14 In certain respects the accused was
given more protection in a preliminary hearing than by a grand jury
indictment because although the accused may appear at the hearing with
counsel and cross-examine the government's witnesses, accused persons
are barred from grand jury deliberations.' 5 Justice John M. Harlan,
writing the single dissenting opinion, complained that an essential ele-
ment of liberty was being sacrificed by this process:
In the secrecy of the investigations by grand juries, the weak and
helpless-proscribed, perhaps, because of their race, or pursued by
an unreasoning public clamor-have found, and will continue to
find, security against official oppression, the cruelty of mobs, the
machinations of falsehood, and the malevolence of private persons
who would use the machinery of the law to bring ruin upon their
personal enemies.'
But this plaintive cry was lost in the rush for innovation, and many of
the western states followed California's lead in eliminating the require-
ment of grand jury indictments.
17
Between 1953 and 1969, the period when Earl Warren was chief
justice, the Supreme Court ruled that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment incorporated most of the Bill of Rights, and that
the states must as a result provide almost all the protections of the Bill of
12. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
13. CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
14. 110 U.S. at 537-38.
15. For a more complete discussion see Alexander & Portman, Grand Jury
Indictment Versus Prosecution by Information: An Equal Protection-Due Process Issue,
25 HASTINGS L.J. 997 (1974). See also Justice Mosk's concurring opinion in Johnson v.
Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 248, 255-70, 539 P.2d 792, 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32, 36
(1975).
16. 110 U.S. at 554-55.
17. See Appendix infra.
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Rights to their citizens. 18 The grand jury is, however, one of only two
guarantees in the Bill of Rights that have been left out of this process of
incorporation, 9 apparently because preliminary hearings have been ac-
knowledged to provide effective protection for defendants, and because
the grand jury's secret processes are viewed with increasing suspicion.20
The grand jury may in theory be a body of citizens designed to protect
people from being falsely accused; but because the grand jury meets in
secret, and because the potential defendant has no right to appear or
refute the government's case, it provides an uncertain protection. The
British, in fact, found the grand jury to be totally unnecessary and
discarded the institution in 1933.1
In the United States, grand juries are still active bodies, but their
main activity has gradually shifted from returning criminal indictments
to investigating major governmental scandals and elaborate criminal
conspiracies. 22  The Supreme Court has permitted grand juries to con-
duct probes without specific goals; 3 indeed grand juries seem increas-
ingly to be searching blindly for evils. It is this activity that has caused
most of the recent controversy.
The Political Implications of Grand Jury Power
and Prosecutorial Manipulation
The romantic image of the grand jury is that of a body of citizens
who gather together to investigate the crimes of the community. In
fact, grand jurors all too often follow the prosecutor's lead completely
and return indictments whenever the district attorney requests them to
do so. 24 They meet behind closed doors, are carefully guided by the
prosecutor, and have almost unlimited power to demand evidence. The
potential for abuse is therefore great, and during the Nixon Administra-
tion a graphic demonstration of abuse was provided for us.
Under the direction of Robert Mardian, the assistant attorney
general in charge of the Justice Department's Internal Security Division,
18. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
19. The other guarantee is the seventh amendment right to jury trial in all civil
matters involving more than twenty dollars.
20. See note 15 supra.
21. The Administration of Justice Act of 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 1.
22. See Van Dyke & Wolinsky, Quadra v. Superior Court of the City and County
of San Francisco: A Challenge to the Composition of the San Francisco Grand Jury, 27
HASTmNS L. 565, 582-84 (1976).
23. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
24. See, e.g., Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System (pts. 1-3), 10 ORE. L.
RIv. 101, 217, 295 (1931).
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and Guy Goodwin, head of the division's Special Litigation Section,
federal grand juries were impaneled throughout the country to investi-
gate a wide range of political and radical activity. These investigations
were not primarily aimed at solving particular crimes, but were instead
part of a massive governmental effort to keep close track of radicals and
to trap them into revealing information about their political activities.
Using the grand jury's virtually unlimited power to issue subpoenas, and
the accompanying power to jail for contempt any recalcitrant witnesses,
the Justice Department was able to harass numerous persons who com-
mitted no crimes but did pose a threat to the Nixon Republicans because
of their ideas.
In October and November of 1970, five young political activists in
Los Angeles were subpoenaed by a federal jury in Tucson, Arizona, and
were asked questions like:
Tell the grand jury every place you went after you returned to your
apartment from Cuba, every city you visited, with whom and by
what means of transportation you traveled and who you visited at
all of the places you went during the times of your travels after
you left your apartment in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in May 1970.25
After refusing to answer these questions, all five were held in contempt
and spent the next four months in jail until the term of that grand jury
expired.20 The Justice Department was thus using federal grand juries
to supplement the work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, asking
subpoenaed witnesses those questions that they had refused to answer to
the bureau, and jailing them if they did not cooperate.
In a similar incident, Donald and Patricia Grumbles, a young
couple in their early twenties, were held in contempt for refusing to
answer questions before a federal grand jury concerning raids in 1970
and 1971 on government files in Media, Pennsylvania, and Camden
and Bridgeton, New Jersey. They were freed from prison in March
1973 after serving for nineteen and fourteen months respectively. The
grand jury, although technically still in session until March 1973, had in
fact been inactive for many months. Finally, a federal judge ruled that
the lengthy incarceration was punitive and ordered their release. 27 Lat-
er that month, Senator Edward M. Kennedy denounced the govern-
ment's use of special grand juries to investigate radical activity, calling
them "kangaroo grand juries" and stating that they were "a dangerous
25. Donner & Cerruti, The Grand Jury Network, THa NATION Jan. 3, 1972, at 5,
6.
26. Id. at 7.
27. N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1973, at 33, col. 7 (city ed.).
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modem form of star chamber secret inquisition that is trampling the
rights of American citizens from coast to coast."2  During that same
year, Justice William 0. Douglas wrote, "It is, indeed, common knowl-
edge that the grand jury, having been conceived as a bulwark between
the citizen and the Government, is now a tool of the Executive."29 These
grand jury inquisitions, although created during Richard Nixon's presi-
dency, did not end with his forced resignation. The federal government
has continued to use investigative grand juries as a vehicle to subpoena
political activists and imprison them for contempt if they fail to respond
to wide-ranging requests for information on an almost endless list of
subjects. Some writers have maintained that gay women and movement
attorneys have been singled out for particular attention by federal grand
juries.
30
State grand juries also have almost unlimited power to obtain
information, to harrass witnesses, and to indict, and they too have
sometimes abused this power. Examples of this abuse are not difficult
to chronicle. Sol Price, a San Diego County grand juror, resigned in
disgust in 1966 because that grand jury was returning indictments with-
out any rigorous investigations of the assertions made by the district
attorney.31 Edison Uno, a San Francisco County grand juror who
decided to take his job of municipal investigator seriously, was virtually
barred from the county jail one Saturday morning in 1970 because the
jailers had never heard of a grand juror coming unannounced to in-
spect.32 Several grand jurors resigned from the Matin County, Califor-
nia, grand jury in 1971 because their fellow jurors returned indictments
based on virtually no evidence against lawyer Stephen Bingham and six
prison inmates after George Jackson, the Black Panther prison activist,
was killed at San Quentin State Prison.3 Finally, a member of the 1971
Los Angeles County grand jury has complained that the jurors were
unable to ask any questions of the witnesses themselves; written ques-
tions they submitted to the district attorney were frequently unasked
because the questions might hurt the prosecution's case; grand jurors
28. N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1973, at 11, col. 1 (city ed.).
29. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 23 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
30. See, e.g., Avery, New Wave of Grand Juries Harasses Women, GuIa NoTEs,
May 1975, at 3; Conyers, Grand Juries: The American Inquisition, R.APARTs, Aug.-
Sept. 1975, at 14; Solowey, The Grand Jury: Making Trouble for Movement Lawyers?,
JuLs DOcrOR, Mar. 1976, at 36.
31. Interview with Sol Price, July 7, 1971.
32. Interview with Edison Uno, Feb. 5, 1975.
33. See Judging the Grand Jury, TWME Feb. 7, 1972, at 59-60.
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were frequently given off-the-record evidence that would not be admissi-
ble in trial; exhibits were loosely handled; and it was suggested that only
if the grand jury were given an independent legal advisor unconnected
with the district attorney's office could it really function as an independ-
ent body.34
Selecting the Grand Jury
The only way that we can guarantee that grand jury abuses such as
those outlined above do not continue to occur is to insure that member-
ship on our grand juries accurately reflects the composition of the
population at large. Grand juries composed only of elite and influential
citizens are particularly vulnerable to governmental abuse; it is unlikely
that such juries may be safely trusted to represent the interests of less
powerful groups in society.
When the grand jury first became a body separate and distinct
from the trial jury, those selected to serve as grand jurors were wealthier
and of a higher social class than their trial jury counterparts because
their jurisdiction was broader and their potential power was greater. 35
This tradition remains intact, and, although the statutes in most states
say that grand jurors are to be selected in the same manner as trial
jurors, substantial differences nonetheless frequently exist in practice
and result.30 About a dozen states still consciously impanel blue-ribbon
grand juries and give these grand juries extensive investigating power
that is more important than their indicting role.
Various justifications are given for this practice. Some commenta-
tors and judges have argued that because many grand juries perform
both a watch-dog function (supervising governmental agencies) and an
investigative function (probing into abuses of power) the grand jurors
must be sophisticated and well educated; otherwise they could be fooled
by the officials they are supposed to investigate.3T Another common
justification given for the predominance of affluent and retired profes-
sionals on grand juries is that the time required of grand jurors is so
34. Young, The Grand Jury Needs an Impartial Arbiter, L.A. Times, May 8, 1972,
pt. H, at 7, col. 3.
35. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
36. See text accompanying notes 40-42 infra.
37. See, e.g., Petersen, The California Grand Jury System: A Review and Sugges-
tions for Reform, 5 PAC. L.J. 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Petersen]. See also People v.
Hoiland, 22 Cal. App. 3d 530, 99 Cal. Rptr. 523, 529 (1971).
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great that only persons who are to some extent independently wealthy
can perform the required task adequately.
3 8
Neither of these justifications are persuasive, however, because
both problems could be easily solved by modest increases in the expend-
itures provided for grand juries. In order to allow all persons to
respond to this civic responsibility when called upon, the pay provided
to grand jurors should be raised; in those jurisdictions where grand
jurors are required to serve for a year or more, the pay should be raised
above that given to trial jurors, perhaps to fifty or sixty dollars a day.
Similarly, any problem created by grand jurors who have trouble
understanding the economic intricacies of local government can be
solved by permitting each grand jury to hire its own attorney and
investigator to assist the grand jurors in conducting its investigations.39
Of course, the grand jurors themselves must be permitted to select both
the attorney and the investigator, who must be totally independent of the
local governments subject to investigation. With such staff assistance, a
randomly selected body of citizens can conduct a sophisticated review of
their local governmental agencies. These alternatives that would be
preferable to the blue-ribbon grand juries are still impaneled in many
states.
Selecting Local Grand Juries
The statutes of many states provide that grand jurors are to be
chosen in the same manner as trial jurors, but in actual practice,
potential grand jurors are frequently screened carefully by the judges so
that those finally selected are in fact an elite group. In 'Colorado, for
instance, a random list of from 50 to 75 names of potential jurors is
produced by a computor, but these people are then carefully inter-
viewed by a judge and the district attorney, and the two of them se-
lect the twelve grand jurors.40 In St. Louis, Missouri, 2,000 names are
taken off the trial jury wheel; this list is then divided into forty lists of
50 names. Each of the forty lists is then sent to one of the local judges
who determines who on the list is eligible for grand jury service. The
law requires that at least 600 names in total be deemed eligible. Those
38. See, e.g., Deposition of The Honorable Robert Drewes, May 8, 1975, at 33,
Quadra v. Superior Court, Civil No. C-72-1689 (N.D. Cal., filed Sept. 20, 1972).
39. See Mei Kato Bickner, The Grand Jury ... A Layman's Assessment .. , 48
CAL. ST. BJ. 660, 737 (1973).
40. Interview with A. Erickson, Jury Commissioner, Denver County, Colorado,
July 3, 1972.
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eligible are then put into a wheel from which 75 names are drawn.
From this list, the presiding judge selects twelve grand jurors and
two alternates to serve for a term of ten weeks.4 Those who be-
come grand jurors have thus been carefully screened for their accepta-
bility.
In Baltimore, Maryland, 200 names are selected at random from
the voter registration list and these people are asked whether they can
spare the time required for service. A random selection is then made
from those willing to serve. The grand jury meets every day for four
months, reviewing most serious criminal matters that pass through the
courts and conducting some investigations of local agencies. The only
persons who can spare the time to sit on the grand jury are dependent
spouses, retired persons, and those rare employees who are released with
pay by their employer for the four-month period.4"
Some states do truly try to select grant jurors randomly. In
Oregon, all prospective grand and trial jurors are selected from the voter
registration list, and summoned together for their four weeks of service.
At the courthouse, they are interviewed by a clerk and if found accepta-
ble, are sworn in as jurors. Most of these persons become trial jurors,
but seven names are randomly selected by the jury commissioner to
serve as grand jurors.43
Blue-Ribbon Panels
Some states make no pretense whatsoever that their grand juries
are randomly selected; instead, these states consciously seek to impanel
only the "most qualified" citizens. Among the states that attempt to
select only blue-ribbon grand juries are California, New York and
Texas, three of our nation's most populous states. Although this prac-
tice has been defended,4 4 these states frequently are left with grand
juries filled with the friends and political cronies of the judges and other
office holders.
Connecticut provides a striking example of this result. The func-
tion of the grand jury in Connecticut is to return indictments in capital
41. Interview with John T. Barrett, Jury Commissioner, St. Louis, Missouri, Mar.
30, 1973.
42. Interview with Dulany Foster, Chief Judge of the Baltimore, Maryland,
Superior Court, Aug. 14, 1972.
43. Statement by Michael D. Hall, Circuit Court Administrator and Jury Commis-
sioner, Multnomah County (Portland), Oregon, July 11, 1972.
44. See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra & 57-58 infra.
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cases. On rare occasions a grand jury is impaneled to conduct an
investigation, but the body's investigatory duties are limited and irregu-
lar. This limited role is fortunate because this state's grand juries do
not in any way represent the population of the state. They are hand
picked by the county sheriffs who act with absolutely no guidelines of
any sort. Until the 1940's, Connecticut had allowed each town to elect
its grand jurors, who were considered town officials, but this democratic
practice was abolished throughout the state; now the sheriff acts alone, 45
much like the royal sheriffs of pre-colonial England.
46
An illustration of the grand jury selection process in New Haven
was provided in 1970 just prior to the murder trial of Black Panther
leaders Bobby Seale and Ericka Huggins. Seale's attorney, Charles
Garry, examined the 73 year-old sheriff of New Haven at length,47 and
Sheriff Slavin conceded that he simply used his "own judgment" and
tended to select people he knew and liked.48
The sheriff had met grand juror Harrison Sipes at a Democratic
convention. William Hine was a Democratic town chairman and had
been a friend of the sheriff for about forty years. Both are members of
the Elks club. Sheriff Slavin had known Mrs. Abbie Creem's husband
for thirty years. Edwin Joy was also a close friend. William Bratten,
another of the grand jurors, was recommended by one of the sheriff's
friends. Then there was Fred Colley, who was the sheriff's barber and
Joseph Shea, the owner of the barber shop. Finally, Arthur Jaqua, who
served as an alternate, had previously worked for the sheriff as a jailor.49
Others on that eighteen member grand jury were rounded up in an
even more haphazard fashion. When asked how William Gallagher, a
lawyer, became a grand juror, the sheriff responded:
I found him out in the hallway, I guess. We needed somebody
to substitute that morning, because one of the fellows couldn't come
in. So we got him to go on the Grand Jury. . . . I had to have
a Grand Jury. There was a fellow that was sick.50
Six of the eighteen grand jurors and two alternates had served as grand
jurors before, because it was Sheriff Slavin's custom to use his acquaint-
45. Letter from Connecticut State Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, to Jon Van Dyke,
Jan. 31, 1972.
46. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
47. Illustrative exerpts from this examination are printed in WHrrE JUSTICE 266-88
(S. Blackburn ed. 1971).
48. Id. at 269.
49. Id. at 272-87.
50. Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Quash Indictment at 81-82, State v. Seale,
Civil No. 15644, (New Haven County Conn. Super. Ct., filed Oct. 30, 1970).
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ances over and over again. Eleven of the twenty were fifty years old or
over.
51
This body, theoretically impaneled to represent the community's
conscience and to act as a shield against governmental oppression,
indicted Bobby Seale and Ericka Huggins on the basis of the uncorro-
borated testimony of a government informer and caused them to remain
in jail for two years without bail; they were finally released on May 25,
1971, after a trial jury could not reach a unanimous verdict of any sort
and the trial judge ruled that a second impartial jury could not be
impaneled.52
In 1973, this system of personal selection of grand jurors by local
sheriffs was held constitutional by the Supreme Court of Connecticut.53
In 1975, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
upheld this decision.54
California
California's prestigious grand juries are primarily investigative
bodies, with broad responsibility to examine all county activities. They
also consider criminal indictments that the district attorney feels are
either politically sensitive or require some measure of secrecy. Most
shootings by police officers, for instance, are presented to a grand jury,
with the result that if no indictment is handed down, the public may
never learn the details of the incident.55 Sexual crimes are also usually
referred to the grand jury. But over 95 percent of all California felonies
charged are brought by information and a preliminary hearing rather
than by grand jury indictment,56 and the grand jurors spend most of
their time, meeting once or twice a week for a year, investigating local
government activities.
In most of the state's fifty-eight counties, all grand jurors are
nominated by the superior court judges. In Santa Clara County, each
51. Id.
52. Wrm JusTIcE 288 (S. Blackburn ed. 1971).
53. State v. Cobbs, 164 Conn. 402, 324 A.2d 234, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 861
(1973).
54. Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975).
55. The Santa Clara County District Attorney, Louis P. Bergna, has said that he
normally submits police shootings to the grand jury. Memo from Louis P. Bergna to the
Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors, Apr. 26, 1974.
56. Petersen, supra note 37, at 8, citing BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CAL-
IFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JusncE, FELONY DEFENDANTS DISPOSED OF IN CALIFORNIA
CoumRS, 5 (1971).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28
GRAND JURIES
of the twenty-four judges nominates one grand juror and the six senior
judges are permitted an additional nominee. Nineteen persons are then
drawn by lot from the thirty nominees. Santa Clara District Attorney
Louis P. Bergna told a state legislative committee in 1968 that "[i]t's
not democratic .... Grand jurors, I think are more apt to be members
of the local country club than they are of the local union [but] what's
democratic about the way judges are chosen?"5 7 Santa Clara County
Judge George Barnett defended the blue-ribbon aspects of the grand
jury by saying, "We need leader types, we don't want a passive grand
jury. . . . It takes 12 to return an indictment, what if we drew only
revolutionaries, pot smokers, who would vote against indictments?"
'5 8
In Los Angeles County, which because of its size is allowed a
grand jury of twenty-three, each judge nominates two persons, and then
the complete list of over 200 nominees is circulated among the judges
and made available for public inspection. A police investigation is
made of all the prospective jurors, and then the judges vote on the
nominees. The thirty-four persons receiving the most votes constitute
the final list, and the county clerk draws twenty-three names at random
from this list.59 By contrast, rural Nevada County, in the foothills of
the Sierras, has only one superior court judge who nominates thirty
persons by himself; nineteen names are then drawn by lot from this list
to serve as grand jurors. In 1972, Harold Berliner, the district attorney
in Nevada County, protested the judge's selections because ten of the
grand jurors were connected with the real estate industry, and only six
were wage earners or spouses of wage earners. Berliner had been
fighting against overdevelopment for some time and feared he would be
unable to obtain indictments against despoilers of the environment from
such a grand jury. He was unable, however, to obtain any relief from
the courts. 0
Studies made of selected counties in the state reveal that the result
of this system of hand-picking grand jurors is a significant underrepre-
sentation of blue-collar workers, women, the young, and minority
groups on California grand juries.
57. Cohen, The grand jury-who needs it?, Town Crier (Los Altos), Oct. 3, 1973,
at 16, col. 1.
58. Id.
59. Comment, Grand Jury Discrimination and the Mexican American, 5 LOYOLA
L. RaV. (Los Angeles) 87, 92 (1972).
60. Berliner v. Super. Ct., No. 13434 (Cal. Ct. App., Mar. 6, 1972), petition for
hearing denied (Sup. Ct., Mar. 30, 1972).
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Alameda County
Peter Sperlich, Professor of Political Science at the Berkeley cam-
pus of the University of California and an expert on statistical studies of
both trial juries and grand juries,"' studied the composition of the 1969-
72 grand juries in Alameda County, and submitted the following break-
down of their demographic characteristics as part of a jury challenge in
the trial of Wendy Yoshimura:62
Pop. of
Alameda Grand Jury Panels
Characteristic County 1969 1970 1971 1972 all four**
Age
21-29 years* 25.8% 0 % 2.3% 0 % 2.6% 1.2%
30 + years 74.2 100 97.7 100 97.4 98.8
Occupation
Blue Collar* 36.8% 7.0% 3.1% 3.6% 0 % 3.7%
White Collar 63.2 93.0 96.9 96.4 100 96.3
Income (Family)
to $9,999* 42.3% 11.1% 3.0% 3.8% 12.1% 7.8%
$10,000 & more 57.7 88.9 97.0 96.2 87.9 92.2
Gender
Female* 51.0% 31.8% 39.1% 47.8% 40.0% 39.0%
Male 49.0 68.2 60.9 52.2 60.0 61.0
* Test Group
** Arithmetic Average of the Four Separate Panels
Since 1972, the situation in Alameda County has improved very little.
The nineteen members of the 1974-75 grand jury included only one
black, two Spanish surnamed persons, seven women, and nobody under
forty. All were either retired, not regularly employed, or employed in a
flexible job with hours that could be manipulated at their convenience.
Only one salaried wage earner, a gardener for the East Bay Regional
Park District, was selected as a grand juror, but he had to resign almost
immediately because his employer refused to continue his normal salary
during those days of grand jury service, and the gardener could not
survive on the ten dollars a day that the county pays its grand jurors .
3
61. See, e.g., Sperlich & Jaspovice, Grand Juries, Grand Jurors, and the Constitu-
tion, 1 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 63 (1974); Sperlich & Jaspovice, Statistical Decision Theory
and the Selection of Grand Jurors: Testing for Discrimination in a Single Panel, 2 HAST.
CONST. L.Q. 75 (1975).
62. Declaration of Peter Sperlich, Mar. 24, 1976, People v. Yoshimura, No.
52904, (Super. Ct., Alameda County, California, filed Apr. 12, 1972).
63. Interviews with Joseph Grodin, foreperson of the 1974-75 Alameda County
grand jury, July 11, 1974, Aug. 17, 1974, Aug. 30, 1974. For other statistics on
Alameda County grand juries see Comment, The Civil Petitioner's Rights to Representa-
tive Grand Juries and a Statistical Method of Showing Discrimination in Jury Selection
Cases Generally, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 581 (1973).
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Matin County"
Superior Court Judge Vernon Stoll ruled in 1974 that the 1971
Matin County Grand Jury had been selected unconstitutionally and "did
not assure a fair representation" of "the Blacks, the Latin Americans,
the blue-collar working class and the young ... ."04 This decision,
however, was reversed by the California Court of Appeal which con-
cluded that Judge Stoll had erred in looking only to the result of the
selection process, even though the fact that the judges exercise unbridled
discretion in selecting grand jurors gives them an opportunity to dis-
criminate.65 The Matin County Grand Jury is still selected by the judges
upon recommendations from civic organizations, and older, affluent
whites continue to dominate its composition."6
Riverside County
A study of persons nominated to serve as grand jurors by the
superior court judges of Riverside County between 1968 and 1972
revealed that only 4.9 percent had an annual income of less than $6,000
(compared to 30.2 percent of the population of the county), that only
2.4 percent were under thirty (compared to 19.8 percent of the popula-
tion of the county over twenty-one), and that only 32.5 percent had not




A study of grand jurors in San Diego county between 1962 and
1971 showed that every one of the 136 employed grand jurors had white
64. People v. Bingham, No. 4094 (Matin County, Cal. Super. Ct., Jan. 17, 1974).
65. People v. Pinell, 43 Cal. App. 3d 627, 117 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1974). Judge
Stoll's approach of examining the result alone in situations involving the exercise of
personal discretion in selecting grand jurors is supported by substantial authority. See
Quadra v. Superior Court, 403 F. Supp. 486 (N.D. Cal. 1975). An earlier opinion in
Quadra appears at 378 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
66. The grand jury empaneled in 1972, for instance, contained only one blue-collar
worker, only one person under thirty, no blacks, and only one person of Hispanic
background. Declaration of Ruth Astle, Apr. 29, 1974, People v. Baeza, No. 4960
(Maria County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Jan. 10, 1974).
67. This demographic survey was conducted by Ruth Astle, David Light, and
Jamie Kalven for two cases: People v. Lawton, No. 9138 (Riverside County, Cal.
Super. Ct., filed June 7, 1971); People v. Gardiner, No. 9485 (Riverside County, Cal.
Super. Ct., filed Oct. 7, 1971). During the five year period involved, 352 persons were
nominated as grand jurors. The investigators were able to obtain the income informa-
tion from 226 of the nominees, the age information from 255 of the nominees, and the
education information from 249 of the nominees.
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collar jobs and that of the 55 grand jurors who were retired, only one-a
maintenance painter-had been a blue-collar worker before retirement.
None of the 191 grand jurors selected during that ten-year period was
under thirty, and between 1968 and 1971, 85.1 percent of the grand
jurors were forty-five or over, even though only 49.9 percent of the over-
twenty-one population of the county was over forty-four years old. 8
San Francisco
The grand juries of San Francisco have been under attack for some
time. After protracted litigation, United States District Court Judge
Charles B. Renfrew ruled that "persistent underrepresentation" of non-
whites and women was "sufficiently substantial to establish a prima facie
case of unconstitutional exclusion. "69 Following this decision, the San
Francisco superior court judges, who had previously split the grand jury
functions between two grand juries, one that passed on criminal in-
dictments and a second that performed the civil investigative func-
tion, voted to select both of these grand juries from the voter registration
list. After 1977, grand jurors will be randomly selected from a com-
bined list formed from the voter registration list and the list of holders of
California driver's licenses70
San Joaquin County
Located in the heart of California's central valley, this county uses
a hybrid form of selection, with the superior court judges making some
nominations, and then adding randomly selected names from the
voter registration list. Many of the randomly selected persons re-
quest to be excused, however, so that the judges' nominees still com-
prise about half of the people who become grand jurors. A study
of the thirty persons who reached the final stage in the years 1970 to
1973 revealed that only 2.2 percent were under thirty (compared to
26.8 percent of the population over eighteen), only 9.8 percent earned
less than $6,000 annually (compared to 26.3 percent of the adult
population), and only 13.9 percent were blue-collar workers (compared
68. Committee of the County Bar, Report of the Grand Jury Committee, San
Diego County Bar Association, 9 SAN DIEGO L. R~v. 145, 150-53 (1972).
69. Quadra v. Superior Court, 403 F. Supp. 486 (N.D. Cal. 1975). An earlier
opinion in this case appears at 378 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
70. The plaintiffs' briefs and a fuller description of the Quadra litigation can be
found in Van Dyke & Wolinsky, Quadra v. Superior Court of the City and County of
San Francisco: A Challenge to the Composition of the San Francisco Grand Jury, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 565 (1976).
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to 33.6 percent of the employed population). 71 For the 1974-75 grand
jury, the judges nominated twenty-five persons; another fifty were select-
ed randomly from the voter list. Of those nominated by the judges,
only 8.3 percent earned less than $6,000 yearly, only 14.3 percent were
blue-collar workers, and none were under thirty or -of Hispanic origin.
San Joaquin County Superior Court Judge Martin E. Rothenberg has
since ruled that the United States Constitution requires that the judges
affirmatively seek out jurors who will constitute a fair cross section of
the community, and that the results in San Joaquin County indicate that
they have not fulfilled this duty.
72
Santa Clara County
A survey of the approximately thirty persons who reached the final
selection stage in Santa Clara County during the years 1970 to 1974
revealed a similar pattern. Only 2 percent were under thirty (compared
to 27 percent of the population over twenty-one), only 4 percent were
blue-collar workers (compared to 41 percent of the employed popula-
tion), and only 23 percent had not gone to college (compared to 63
percent of the adult population) ."'
In 1974, an indictment issued by the Santa Clara Grand Jury was
quashed after the defendant, a woman, was able to demonstrate that from
1969 through 1973, an average of only 12 percent of the persons selected
to be grand jurors were women, although women made up over 50 per-
cent of the county's population.74 Superior Court Judge Robert W.
Carter found that "the 1973 Santa Clara Grand Jury selection and its ul-
timate composition demonstrates a statistical discriminatory result rather
than the product of discriminatory design. '7 5 Judge Carter ordered the
71. Demographic survey prepared by Rosemond Davis, Sept. 16, 1975, People v.
Castro, No. 26416 (San Joaquin County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Dec. 10, 1974). Of the
119 persons who reached the final selection stage, age and income data was obtained for
92, and occupation information was obtained for 108.
72. Id.
73. Demographic survey prepared by Ruth Astle and Jamie Kalven for People v.
Moreno, No. 58659 (Santa Clara County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Aug. 27, 1974).
Of the 147 persons involved, the investigators obtained age and education information
for 120 and occupation information for 137.
74. Table appended to Decision, People v. Peraza, No. 57546 (Santa Clara, Cal.
Super. Ct., filed Jan. 29, 1974). Peraza and Navarrette, his codefendant, were indicted
by the same grand jury but only Navarrette, a woman, was held to have standing to raise
the constitutional objection. Peraza, described in the opinion as "a 42-year-old male of
Mexican-American heritage," was held to have no standing to raise the issue of the
underrepresentation of women on the grand jury because he was not a member of the
excluded class. Decision, id. at 4-5. But see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
75. Id. at 6.
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indictment quashed, "since the thrust of a tenable constitutional chal-
lenge is directed to a substantial under-representation of a cognizable
class over a substantial period of time by a member of that class."7 6
Santa Cruz County
An examination of the finalists in Santa Cruz County during the
years 1969 and 1973 revealed that not one had an annual salary of less
than $6,000 (compared to 30.6 percent of the county's population),
only 2.5 percent were under thirty (compared to 19 percent of the
population); only 8.5 percent were blue-collar workers (compared to
49.6 percent of the employed population); only 18.9 percent had not
gone to college (compared to 68.8 percent of the adult population), and
only 18.9 percent were women (compared to 53.8 percent of the adult
population).
77
Because of the increasing litigation on grand jury composition, a
number of counties is experimenting with random grand juries. 78 San
Francisco's random selection for 1976-77 is the first such attempt by a
major urban county. Most counties are, however, reluctant to abandon
the hand-selected blue-ribbon approach. For the most part, the affluent
white male judges still pick their acquaintances, and hence most grand
juries in California are dominated by affluent, white males.
79
New York
The grand juries of the most populous state in the east are selected
76. Id. The opinion goes on to note, however, that "obviously corrective action
has been taken in that the 1974 Santa Clara County Grand Jury is composed of a
majority of women, including a female foreman." Id.
77. Demographic survey prepared by Ruth Astle, David Light, and Jamie Kalven
for People v. Solano, No. 52387, (Santa Cruz County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Jan. 23,
1974). Of the 143 nominees, income data was obtained for 106, age information for
120, occupation data for 118, and education information for 122. The sex of all 143 was
known.
78. See, e.g., Petersen, supra note 37, at 7 (reporting that Butte, Merced, and
Ventura Counties select grand juries randomly); Thomson, Grand Jury Reform--
Coming One Way or Another, 6 CALIF. J. 443, 444 (1975) (stating that Sacramento,
Butte, and El Dorado counties have at least some randomness built into their selection
systems).
79. The underrepresentation of Native Americans and persons of Hispanic origin
on California grand juries is perhaps even greater than that of other minority groups. A
study by the United States Commission on Civil Rights focusing on the 1957 to 1968
grand juries selected in California counties indicates that the underrepresentation of
Spanish surnamed persons ranged from 48% to 94%; underrepresentation of Native
Americans was 82% and 100% in two counties studied. U.S. Comn'N ON CrV RIGHTs,
MXICAN AMERICANS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JusTIcE IN THE SouTHwEs (1970).
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through a conscious and sophisticated attempt to gather together the
most established people of the community. A roster of eligible persons is
maintained, and each year a small number of persons between thirty-five
and sixty-five are selected from the trial jury lists and are invited to join
the list of persons eligible for grand jury service. Those who respond
affirmatively-perhaps a third of those receiving letters-are fingerprint-
ed and subjected to a rigorous police investigation. If they pass, they are
eligible to become grand jurors.
A challenge to this selection process was started in 1964 by persons
who had been held in contempt for refusing to answer questions about
the riots that occurred in Harlem that year. They established that the
1964 grand jury list was different from the population of Manhattan in




Demographic Group Grand Jury List (1960 Census)
Blacks 1.7 24
Puerto Ricans 0.3 12
Blue-Collar Workers 1.2 47
Despite the virtually total exclusion of non-whites and the poor, and the
absolute exclusion of the young, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit refused to rule that this procedure was unconstitu-
tional."' The opinion was written by Judge Irving R. Kaufman, the
chairman for many years of the federal judiciary's Committee on the
Operation of the Jury System and a person who has in other contexts
advocated the position that the jury should represent a cross section of
the community. 2 The United States Supreme Court refused to review
the decision."3
Another example of the elite composition of New York grand
juries is the panel assembled to consider the indictments against the New
York Black Panthers in 1969. Of the twenty-seven persons drawn from
the grand jury list and then questioned, twenty-three were male; their
average age was fifty-eight and the youngest was forty-nine; their aver-
80. United States ex rel. Chestnut v. Criminal Ct. of City of N.Y., 442 F.2d 611,
614 (2d Cir. 1971). The blue-collar percentage comes from the 1966 grand jury list.
81. Id.
82. Hearing on Federal Jury Selection Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 251
(1967).
83. Chestnut v. Criminal Ct. of the City of N.Y., 404 U.S. 856 (1971).
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age income was $23,875; and their average net worth was an astound-
ing $187,792. All had previously sat on grand juries, and one women
stated that she had been sitting on grand juries for forty years. Only
three had blue-collar jobs.
84
In connection with a later challenge of the New York grand jury
selection procedure, 5 an examination by the Queens County Legal Aid
Society of the 1972 Queens County grand jury list revealed that only
13.1 percent of the 1,500 persons on the list were women, and that only
18.5 percent were blue-collar workers compared to a county-wide per-
centage of 39.6. Although the race could not be identified readily by
looking at the questionnaires, an examination of the addresses of the
grand jurors indicated that blacks were probably underrepresented by at
least 50 percent.8 6 While that challenge to the grand jury selection
procedure was pending, the Legal Aid Society obtained an affidavit
from one grand juror, Monique Golden, who stated that in her own
grand jury and in two others that she had observed, only two women
and no blacks or Puerto Ricans could be found out of a total of sixty-
nine jurors. "The typical grand juror," she said, "and there clearly was,
in my experience, a typical grand juror-was white, male, above average
in socio-economic terms. . . and tended to be elderly (a great many of
the grand jurors were retired).""7  A subsequent examination of the
1971 grand jury list found 4.4 percent non-whites, compared to 11.6
percent non-white among the population over twenty-one in Queens
County.8
8
In 1974, the New York legislature passed a bill that would have
changed the selection of grand jurors to a random method, but the bill
was vetoed by Governor Malcom Wilson, after heavy lobbying by the
New York State District Attorneys Association, a group representing all
of the prosecutors in the state.8 9
Texas
Texas provides a final example of a selection procedure designed to
84. Lefcourt, Voir Dire of New York Grand Jury, 28 THE NAT. LAWYERS GumD
PRAMCrNER 78, 85 (Summer 1969).
85. Johnson v. Durant, No. 73C.1159-EN (E.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 3, 1973).
86. Affidavit by sociologist Eric Single, Sept. 27, 1973, Johnson v. Durant, No.
73C.1159-EN (E.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 3, 1973).
87. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Oct. 9, 1973, at 18, Johnson v. Durant, No. 73C.1159-EN (E.D.N.Y., filed
Aug. 3, 1973).
88. Id. at 19.
89. N.Y. Times, June 23, 1974, at 1, col. 2.
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insure that only the elite are chosen as grand jurors. The presiding
judge of each county in Texas appoints five jury commissioners whose
sole task is to produce a short list of sixteen to twenty persons, the first
twelve of whom usually become grand jurors. Because the selection of
grand jurors in Texas has been frequently challenged, 90 the jury com-
missioners are told that a racial balance is required, and they do try to
include token numbers of non-whites. In Bexar County, which includes
San Antonio, six grand juries containing a total of seventy-two jurors are
impaneled each year; between 1959 and 1968, the number of Chicanos
selected each year out of the seventy-two ranged from a low of seven
to a high of ten. This narrow range indicates a conscious effort to
stay within a narrow range, which is far below the Chicano population
of the county-about 40 percent. 1
A more recent survey, made of grand jurors who served in Harris
County (Houston) between the years 1969 and 1972, revealed that
only 22 percent of the grand jurors were women (compared to 51 per-
cent of the county population), only 10 percent were under thirty-five
(compared to 24 percent in the county), only 4 percent made less than
$10,000 annually (compared to 47 percent in the county), only 11
percent had not gone to college (compared to 72 percent of the adult
population), and only 3 percent were of Hispanic origin (compared
to 11 percent in the county).92 Federal District Judge John V. Single-
ton, Jr. described this as a "startling socioeconomic, racial, sexual, and
educational imbalance ' 93 and stated that in his personal judgment, the
system of personally selecting grand jurors should be declared uncon-
stitutional. 94
Local superior court judges are largely responsible for this imbal-
ance. The jury commissioners are of course carefully chosen by the
presiding judge, but even so the judge can manipulate the list of
nominees once it is submitted. Judge Jerome Chamberlain, Jr., the
presiding judge of Dallas County in 1970, moved a twenty-four-year-old
90. See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398
(1945); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909).
91. BtmrEAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMEmCF, 1970 CENsus oP
POPULATION, vol. 1, pt. 45, § 1, at 907 (Table 119).
92. Dumont v. Estelle, 377 F. Supp. 374, 386 (S.D. Tex. 1974). Out of 271 grand
jurors, 156 responded to the survey.
93. Id. at 378.
94. Id. at 379. For a sociological study of the Harris County grand jury selection
process see Carp, The Harris County Grand Jury-A Case Study, 12 HoUsr. L. Rnv. 90
(1974).
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Chicano activist whom the jury commissioners had placed in position six
on the list down to number seventeen, moved a black attorney who had
been number eleven down to number sixteen, and downgraded a woman
from number thirteen to number fourteen.9" In explaining his action,
Judge Chamberlain stated, "I thought [the young Chicano] was too
young and did not think he accurately reflected the beliefs and opinions
held by the majority of the people in Dallas County." And as to the
woman:
Well, I wanted a fair representation of individuals in the County
and there were already three women that were selected and named
above them, so probably I changed their positions so that it
wouldn't be a predominance of women or not so many on the
Grand Jury.
This action was challenged by a person subsequently indicted by the
grand jury, but the reviewing Texas court did not find any constitutional
infirmities in the selection scheme. 96
Selection of Federal Grand Jurors
The federal selection system is similar in conception to the Oregon
system,9 7 but all prospective grand jurors are questioned by a judge, and
frequently also by a United States attorney, who inevitably exercises
some discretion in deciding whether a juror should be allowed to remain
on the grand jury. A description of the impaneling of a federal grand
jury that occurred in San Francisco on January 4, 1972, provides an
indication of how the process works." This particular impaneling was
for a normal federal grand jury which sits for three months and consid-
ers federal indictments. It was a typical selection process in all respects.
The process started much earlier when questionnaires were sent to
all persons on the "master wheel." Those found to be qualified were
moved to the "qualified wheel," and from this qualified group eighty-
seven persons were sent summonses to report for grand jury duty.
Eighteen of the eighty-seven were excused prior to the day they were
required to report for duty, and six did not respond in any way. The
rest reported at 10 a.m. in one of the larger courtrooms where they were
met by Judge Robert H. Schnacke and United States Attorney James
95. In re Becker, No. 43-632 (Dallas County, Tex. Super. Ct., Nov. 13, 1972).
96. Id.
97. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
98. The description of the events mentioned in this section is based upon personal
observations.
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Browning. Judge Schnacke conducted all the questioning but he con-
sulted occasionally with Mr. Browning during the session. About
nineteen of the group who came to the courthouse requested at this late
date to be excused, and it is the treatment of these requests that is
instructive.
Judge Schnacke was reluctant to grant excuses to persons with
white-collar occupations and backgrounds but readily excused blue-
collar employees. Two white males about fifty years old, a buyer for an
import-export business and an employee of a shipping firm, requested
excuses because of their businesses. Both were granted delays, but their
names were put back into the qualified wheel, and they were told they
would have to serve later. A third white male, a fifty-five year-old vice
president and senior art director of an advertising firm, requested an
excuse because of his business and was told he would have to serve. He
was subsequently named deputy foreman of the grand jury.
In sharp contrast to this treatment of the white-collar workers, the
three blue-collar employees who requested to be excused because of
their occupations were excused without being questioned, and were not
put back into the qualified wheel. A white male in his early thirties
who stated he was a laborer working on an hourly scale, and that he
would not be paid if he did not work, was excused immediately. A
white male about forty who said he was a laborer in a union was
excused without further questioning. A third white male between forty
and forty-five did not ask to be excused at first; his name was drawn out
of the wheel, and he took a temporary seat on the twenty-three member
panel. He then said, in answer to Judge Schnacke's question, that he
was a truck driver. The judge immediately asked whether he would
prefer to be excused. The truck driver responded that he would lose the
twenty or twenty-five dollars that he usually makes each day if he had to
serve on the jury. Judge Schnacke excused him, without mentioning
that grand jurors receive twenty dollars per day (recently raised to
twenty-five dollars) plus mileage for each day of service.
Another blue-collar worker, a Chicano employed as a foreman at a
refinery, was selected in the first twenty-three to be seated, and he also
was asked specifically by Judge Schnacke if he would be paid while
serving on the jury. None of the white-collar employees was asked that
question by the judge.
The judge also showed a readiness to excuse persons who differed
slightly from the white, middle-class, middle-aged ideal if they presented
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even the slightest basis for being excused. A black woman about forty
years old told Judge Schnacke when he asked for excuses that she had a
slight hearing difficulty. She added, however, that she had served on a
municipal court jury in Oakland during the previous year without any
difficulty. Although she did not specifically ask to be excused, Judge
Schnacke released her from jury duty. Similarly, a young white male
about twenty-eight years old asked to be excused because he lived in
Mountain View, about thirty miles south of the courthouse. Judge
Schnacke allowed the excuse, saying that, although he did not think
Mountain View was far enough away to justify an excuse on the ground
of distance, he would give the young man the benefit of the doubt.
Again by contrast, the judge did not encourage any of the white,
middle-aged, middle class, jurors to request excuses. A white middle-
aged woman told the court that her husband was a police officer, and
that her son was a guard for the federal government. Judge Schnacke
did not even ask her if she could still be fair and impartial, and he
allowed her to remain on the grand jury.
Finally, the judge selected to be foreman of the grand jury a sixty-
seven year-old white male who is president of a wholesale grocery firm,
and then, as mentioned above, appointed as deputy foreman a fifty-five
year-old white male advertising executive. Judge Schnacke's selection
of two older white males with business backgrounds to head the grand
jury seemed to institutionalize the disproportion that had resulted from
his previous decisions regarding excuses.
Of the twenty-three jurors finally selected, only seven were women,
only one was a black, only one was Chicano, and only one was Asian.
Seventeen of the jurors were employed in white-collar occupations,
three were housewives, and only three were blue-collar workers. Ac-
cording to my estimates of their ages, only two were under thirty, and
another two were between thirty and thirty-five.
This type of grand jury is all too typical. The defendants in a 1975
case in the Northern District of California99 examined the questionnaires
filled out by all the grand jurors selected for twenty-three different
grand juries between 1969 and early 1975, and came up with the
following statistical percentages:
99. United States v. Rafofsky, No. CR-74-687 OJC (N.D. Cal., filed Oct. 23,
1974).
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Federal grand juries tend to underrepresent the young, the poor
and the non-white because they start out with the voter registration list,
which underrepresents these groups; because these lists are stored for
four years at a time, thus discriminating against the most mobile of our
population-i.e., the young, the poor and the non-white; and because
many judges, like Judge Schnacke, seem eager to excuse members of
100. Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of His Motion
to Challenge the Federal Grand Jury, Feb. 11, 1975, United States v. Rafofsky, No. CR-
74-687 OJ (N.D. Cal., filed Oct. 23, 1974). The census figures are adjusted to reflect
a recomputation by the Census Bureau of the Spanish surnamed figure. Id. at 4. See
also San Francisco Chronicle, May 11, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
101. Sixty persons whose race could not be determined are eliminated from these
figures. Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of His Motion
to Challenge the Federal Grand Jury, Feb. 11, 1975, at 4, United States v. Rafofsky, No.
CR-74-687 OJC (N.D. Cal., filed Oct. 23, 1974).
102. Seven persons whose education could not be determined have been eliminated
from these figures. Id. at 5.
103. Five persons whose age could not be determined have been eliminated from
these figures, Id. t 4.
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these groups. °4 Many federal grand juries do not, therefore, represent
the community, but instead represent only the most established and
powerful sectors of our society.
Conclusion
Grand juries have been given enormous power in our legal system:
the power to demand information from anybody, 105 the power to investi-
gate anything, the power to indict any of us. We have given this
awesome power to a body of citizens rather than to a panel of experts
because we distrust bureaucracies and feel that persons in power tend
to abuse that power. We are better protected by an anonymous group
of citizens who cannot use their power to pursue any personal ambitions
and who will drift back into society after their term is over.
If some sectors of the community, however, are systematically
underrepresented on our grand juries, then the grand jury's activities
will be skewed. The interests of all will not necessarily be served. The
body can be an instrument for partisan decisionmaking or be subject to
governmental manipulation.
The United States Supreme Court has repeated several times that
the grand jury must be "a body truly representative of the communi-
ty," 0 6 but that goal is not being met in most of the courts of our
country, as the statistics presented here illustrate. If the grand jury is
once again to act as a bulwark against governmental tyranny, we must
adopt random selection systems to protect against all official manipula-
tion of grand jury composition, and must take more seriously the
responsibility of ensuring the true representativeness of the grand jury.
104. These topics are explored in detail in my forthcoming book on jury selection,
tentatively titled, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain Commitment to Representa-
tive Panels.
105. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1973).
106. Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970); Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
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